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Consideration of the Cost of Capital
• Airports
• Electricity Lines
• Fonterra
• TSO business of Telecom
(supply of local access services to commercially non-viable customers)
• Gas Pipelines
Time for an assessment of the trends
Significance
• If the WACC is too high the network
operator is over-compensated and
investment is encouraged.
• If the WACC is too low, the network
operator is under-compensated and
investment will be discouraged.
• Very large dynamic efficiency costs of a
WACC that is too low.
Infrastructure Industries
• Associated with substantial fixed and
irreversible investment
• Implications:
– The location as well as the quantum of
investment, matters
– Options created and destroyed by
regulation or investment have substantial
value
Regulated Industries
• Regulation sets a maximum return not a
guaranteed return
• Regulated firm is exposed to
competition, technical change and
movements in customers that will affect
return:
– The risk of asset stranding is material
The Commission’s Approach
The weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) as measured by a post-tax
form of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM)
=
The appropriate measure of the rate of
return required by investors in regulated
firms
The Commission’s Approach
• Only systematic risk (captured in beta)
matters
“…the TSO cost of capital is only
concerned with compensation for non-
firm specific risk, and therefore firm-
specific risks …need not be
compensated..”
– An assumption of the model and a
statement of fact?
The Commission’s Approach
• Firms with similar elasticities of demand and
regulatory review periods, but in different
industries, will have comparable asset betas.
Unregulated firms in the same industry are
not comparable: they share industry-specific
rather than systematic risk, and systematic
risk does not affect beta.
The Commission’s Approach
• Incentive regulation affects only firm-specific
   risk so does not affect the required return.
RR for Rate of Return Regulation
=
RR for Price Cap (incentive) Regulation
• Capture firm specific risk in the cash flows (?)
The Commission’s Approach
• Investors do not require compensation for
firm specific risk
• The risk is symmetrical around the
expectation and therefore offsetting
• The expected cash flows are adjusted to
compensate for both the expectation and the
uncertainty around that expectation
• Full ex post compensation for firm specific
risk is to be provided through adjustment of
the cash flows
The Commission’s Approach
If regulation:
Reduces systematic risk (eg. insulating
cash flows from market shocks),
But
Increases firm-specific risk (eg. greater
exposure to competition)
The required rate of return falls.
  
 
 
Type Asset Beta WACC[1]
Electricity Lines 6.9%
Airports - Auckland
Airports – Wellington
Airports – Christchurch
Gas Pipelines
TSO
8.4%
9.3%
8.9%
6.1 – 8.5%
7.1%
Why Do Airports Have A Higher
WACC?
• Higher income elasticity of demand
• No fixed price element in charges
• Greater risk of stranding in gas,
electricity lines and telecommunications,
but (in the CAPM) this does not affect
the required return
The Acid Test
• Is the Commission’s approach
appropriate for the task of calculating
the rate of return required by investors
in regulated firms?
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CAPM
• Assumptions are unrealistic
– This is not unusual in theoretical models
– CAPM has no role for the issues that have been
the focus of microeconomics for 30 years (eg.
information asymmetries)
• Inconsistent with practitioner evidence
• Widespread skepticism about rate of return
estimates on the CAPM
Assumptions and Conclusions
• The claim that specific risk does not
affect the required rate of retun is an
assumption of the CAPM, not an
empirical fact
• Rejecting compensation for specific risk
because it does not affect the required
rate of return in the CAPM effectively
offers assumptions as conclusions
No Easy Solution
• No simple model of how to make
adjustments for the limitations of CAPM
• Can’t value every option
• Using the long-term bond for the risk
free rate introduces a premium but is
theoretically unsatisfactory
• Declining to acknowledge the limits of
the CAPM is not an adequate response
Asset Stranding
• A specific example of violation of the
assumptions of the CAPM
– Irreversible investment given uncertain
demand
• Assumes much more importance under
incentive regulation than it did under
rate of return regulation

Asset Stranding
• Rate of return regulation imposes risk
on customers, whereas incentive
regulation imposes risk on the firm’s
shareholders
– Other things equal, the CAPM says that
investors will require the same rate of
return under both regimes.
Regulated Industries
• High levels of firm specific risk
associated with irreversible investment
– Often exacerbated by the effects of
regulation
• Great divergence between the CAPM
and the market’s required return than in
other industries
Overall
• The Commission has provided a rigorous
application of the CAPM, and has advanced
our understanding of its application to
regulated industries
• The assumptions of the CAPM are unrealistic,
and strong enough to drive perverse
conclusions about the rate of return where
market risk is small and specific risk is large
Overall
• The limitations of CAPM are most
apparent under incentive regulation
– Systematic risk is relatively low and
specific risk is relatively high
• The CAPM provides a starting point for
thinking about the required return for the
regulated firm, not the end point.
